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l. Preliminaries
Given the subject matter of this volume, I might be expected to give a precise ac- 
count of perspectivity, as far as it is petrified in grammar, as a basis for its appli- 
cation in discourse strategies: Unfortunately, in my opinion, the state of the art 
does not allow such a straightforward procedure. What I will try to do is to check 
the field: How can perspectivity be captured within grammar? Which concepts are 
needed in addition? Therefore I will not go into the connection between grammar 
and discourse apart from some remarks in Section 9.
2. The concept of perspectivity: Outline and definitions
There may be quite different aspects of perspectivity that are reflected in grammar 
or even grammaticalized. The deictic categories (personal, local, temporal deixis) 
are means for localizing persons including the Speaker and hearer as well as States 
of affairs in a multidimensional space based primarily on a concept of distance 
(with respect to the Speaker and the speech act). The language-specific Systems of 
personal pronouns, o f local and temporal adverbs, the tense Systems reflect the 
inherent options, between which the Speaker has to make his choice. This choice 
is guided by the Speakers ‘perspective’, i.e. the degree of nearness or distance the 
Speaker is willing to attribute to the focussed entity within the dimension in ques- 
tion. For instance he or she can choose between the ‘du’- and the ‘Sie’-perspective 
in addressing the hearer in German or between preterite or ‘narrative’ or ‘epic’ 
present in referring to past events (cf. the contribution by Quasthoff in this vol-
ume). Even in referring to himself the Speaker may avoid the Standard pronoun 
for the first person singulär and take a more distant and generalized perspective 
(German: man) or a ‘sympathetic’ perspective (German: du)-, cf. the contribution
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by Bredel in this volume. I will not go into the grammaticalization of this ‘deic- 
tic perspectivity’ nor into any other other possible aspects but for the one that is 
central in my eyes: propositional perspectivity.
I would like to Start with an attempt for a definition:
Propositional perspectivity is grammaticalized in a language, if (a) there are 
different propositional constructions containing the same ‘content words’ 
(‘autosemantica’) for referring to identical States of affairs and if (b) these 
differences can be conceived as differences in perspective.
What ‘perspective’ exactly means here, remains to be defined. But, with this defi-
nition, we can exclude right from the beginning those forms of propositional per-
spectivity we might call ‘interpretive conceptualization’. Cases of interpretive con- 
ceptualization are for instance the choice between concieving a Situation as an act 
of killing or an act of murdering or as conceptualizing a Situation as an act of per- 
suading contrasted with conceptualizing it as an act of convincing. In this case nor- 
mally the perspectivity is reflected in the linguistic surface structure by the choice 
of crucially different content words (kill versus murder, persuade versus convince), 
which are by no means synonymous, though there may be meaning relations like 
hyponymy, guaranteeing their possible referential identity.
If the differences between the constructions can be traced back to the predicate 
expression constitutive for the proposition, that is, in general the verb, and if these 
differences are differences in the grammatical realization of the arguments of the 
verb, I call it ‘conversion’ (converses). ln the following I restrict myself to such pairs 
or tuples of converses. With respect to these converses the definition given above 
counts as a hypothesis, i.e. it may be the case, that converses can be explained as 
cases of grammaticalization of propositional perspectivity, but it is also possible 
that only part of the definition applies or even that the explanation fails. 3
3. Types of converses
First of all let me give an overview to 
Types of converses
i. Converses with identical verbs
A interessiert sich für B 
(ärgern, begeistern, freuen, empören) 
“A is interested in B”
(annoy, enchant, please, disgust)
A schickt dem B ein C 
“A sends B a C”
the types of converses I shall deal with.
B interessiert A
“*B interests A” 1
A schickt ein C an B 
“A sends a C to B”
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A füllt ein B in ein C A füllt ein C mit B
“A fills a B into a C” “A fills a C with B’
ii. Converses with change in verb form, especially passive
A schenkt dem B ein C 
“A gives B a C as a present”
iii. Converses by word formation
Prefix verbs:
A wirft ein B auf/gegen/an ein C 
(laden, hängen, kleben, malen, sprühen)
“A throws a B onto/against a C”
(load, hang, glue, paint, spray)
A schenkt dem B ein C 
(liefern, schicken)
“A gives C as a present to B”
(deliver, send)
A kauft von B ein C 
“A buys a C front B”
Particle verbs (particle not separable):
A baut ein B um C 
(hüllen um, ziehen über, legen unter)
“A builds a B around C”
(lay around (‘cover’), pull over, lay under)
iv. Lexical converses
A besitzt ein B 
“A possesses a B”
A gibt dem B ein C 
“A gives B a C” I
ein C wird dem B von A geschenkt 
der B bekommt ein C von A geschenkt 
“a C is given to B as a present by A” 
“B is given a C as a present by A”
A bewirft ein B mit C 
(beladen, behängen, bekleben, 
bemalen, besprühen)
“*A PREF-throws a B with C”2
A beschenkt den B mit C 
(beliefern, beschicken)
“*A PREF-gives B with C” (etc.)
B verkauft dem A ein C 
“*B PREF-buys A a C”
(“B sells A a C”)
A umbaut C mit B
(umhüllen, überziehen, unterlegen)3
“*A around-builds C with B” (etc.)
ein B gehört einem A 
“a B belongs to an A”
B erhält ein C von A 
“B receives a C from A”
I am not going to deal with lexical converses. This would be a matter of “lexicaliza- 
tion of perspectivity”. Lexical converses differ from interpretive conceptualization 
by truth-functional equivalence (with respect to Standard contexts, cf. Section 4) or 
even synonymy between the pairs of lexical items, though there may be borderline 
cases. But certainly there are close relationships between lexical and grammatical
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converses. The first three forms are cases of grammatical conversion and I shall 
examine the issue of perspectivity with them.
4. Propositional identity and perspectivity: Problems
There are some essential difficulties captured in the following three questions:
-  When are two or more propositions or the States of affairs corresponding with 
them identical?
-  When does a difference in perspective exist?
-  Is truth-functional equivalence a necessary and sufficient precondition for 
perspectivity pairs or tuples?
The three questions are not independent of each other. With respect to discussing 
the first two questions there is a difference between starting with propositions or 
even propositional functions and starting with States of affairs. As for propositions 
the usual procedure is to compare two different propositions or propositional func-
tions, as I did. The identity of propositions is only accessible by truth-functional 
equivalence. More exactly: two non-tautological propositions are identical iff they 
represent the same intensions, conceived as functions from indices to truth values 
in the sense of David Lewis (1970). So we could say that two propositions spec- 
ifying identical functions from indices to truth values refer to the same States of 
affairs. Here we have no concept of state of affairs independent from the concept 
of linguistic proposition. I think, with this starting point, the second question, i.e. 
the problem of perspectivity, will typically arise in a specific form: You will notice, 
that the two propositional construction types come out true almost always in the 
same situations, but that there are some situations where they do not both come 
out true and where either one comes out true, one false or where one can not be 
successfully evaluated at all. Here we are inclined to say that the two propositions 
always describe (in a sense) different States of affairs, but that in some cases these 
differences can be neglected. In this case we accept the fundamental perspectivity 
of any linguistic interpretation without being forced to determine a common start-
ing point. On the other hand, starting with States of affairs as independently given 
entities and coming up with their propositional descriptions the idea of a single 
given thing open to different linguistic interpretation is foregrounded, and here 
we approach the problem of perspectivity in a different manner: In this case we 
are inclined to accept the two different propositional constructions as descriptions 
of the same States of affairs and ascribe their difference to different interpreting 
points of view. So the two different starting points lead to two different concepts of 
propositional perspectivity:
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-  fundamental perspectivity (starting with propositions)
-  secondary perspectivity (starting with States of affairs).
I suppose that this divergence, which has up to now not sufficiently been cleared, 
plays an important role in the problem at hand. I am not able myself to fix my 
Position definitely, but I hope, the two positions can be recognized in the following.
With respect to the third question one thing seems to be quite clear: The judge- 
ments about truth-functional equivalence between for example constructions with 
kaufen -  verkaufen diverge in general. And certainly converses are not interchange- 
able in all contexts under the same truth conditions. So where we might accept
( 1) A verkauft C ein B für D / A verkauft ein B an C für D 
“A sells C a B for D” / “A sells a B to C for D”
as a reasonable Statement, we might not always be willing to accept its converse
(2) C kauft ein B von A für D 
“C buys a B from A for D”
as a reasonable Statement and vice versa.
If for instance a car seller teils his reluctant dient: “Ich verkaufe Ihnen jedes 
ModeH’TT seil you any model”, it does not follow that the dient will buy every 
model nor that he will buy any model at all. That is, the equivalence only holds 
in certain Standard contexts, i.e. in descriptive contexts, where the corresponding 
state of affairs is being factually realized and not only intended or considered as 
possible (“intensional contexts”). Generic sentences may be another type of con- 
text where kaufen -  verkaufen cannot be considered equivalent: Schmidt verkauft 
Kühlschränke an Isländer / Smith sells refrigerators to Icelanders versus Isländer 
kaufen Kühlschränke von Schmidt / Icelanders buy refrigerators from Smith.
5. Propositional identity and perspectivity: Positions
Considering only such Standard contexts (see preceding section) there are the fol-
lowing possibilities for dealing with propositional identity between pairs or tuples 
of converses. It seems to be convenient to Start with the -  more usual -  approaches, 
corresponding to secondary perspectivity before proceeding to the approach asso- 
ciated with fundamental perspectivity. (1 also make use of the concept o f ‘semantic 
role’, which will be dealt with later, in a preparatory manner):
a. We assume that there is no difference in truth conditions (starting point prefer- 
ably: state of affairs), then either 1, 2 or 3:
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1. The different grammatical packing is semantically completely irrelevant. A 
thing like difference in grammatical perspective does not exist. Semantic 
roles are not to be assumed or it is assumed that identical truth conditions 
imply identical semantic roles.
2. The different grammatical packing is pragmatically relevant. It has got to 
do with differences in foregrounding/backgrounding.
3. The different grammatical packing is semantically/pragmatically relevant. 
It has got to do with different semantic roles. Identical truth conditions do 
not imply identical semantic roles.
b. We assume that there may be (not necessarily is) a difference in truth con-
ditions (starting point preferably: tuples of propositions), then either 1 or 2:
1. The difference can be handled without different semantic roles by a more 
exact semantic description.
2. Roles have an influence on truth-functional semantics. Different roles may 
imply different truth conditions.
The whole issue is sometimes being complicated by the fact that some authors ar- 
gue for position (a), some for (b) with respect to the same pair of converses. So 
with respect to pairs like German sprühen auf, besprühen mit, English spray onto -  
spray with many people assume a truth-functional difference: besprühen/spray with 
is said to imply an additional condition of completiveness or perfectivity. Jack- 
endoff (1991) for instance however doubts such a principled difference (see also 
Section 8.1).
In the following I will neglect some further problems of conversion: the Prob-
lem of difference in facultative arguments (for instance between kaufen, verkaufen, 
kosten, “buy”, “seil”, “cost”), the problem of loss of one argument (Hans zerbricht 
das Fenster -  Das Fenster zerbricht, Hans öffnet die T ü r- die Tür öffnet sich, “Hans 
is breaking the window” -  “The window is breaking”, “Hans opens the door” -  The 
door is opening”). Even this can be considered as a question of perspectivity.
The positions concerning propositional identity of converses mentioned above 
can serve as a basis for deriving different concepts of perspectivity. We have the 
following alternatives corresponding to the positions in (a) and (b):
I. Derived from (a2): Perspectivity refers to an aspect based on backgrounding- 
foregrounding or centrality-periphery: Perspectivity is foregrounding and 
backgrounding.
II. Derived from (a3): Perspectivity refers to different conceptualization of iden-
tical States of affairs, involving different roles: Perspectivity is ‘secondary per-
spectivity’ with role shift.
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III. Derived from (a2) + (a3): Perspectivity refers to different conceptualization of 
identical States of affairs, involving shift in backgrounding/foregrounding and 
at the same time different semantic roles: Perspectivity is ‘secondary perspec-
tivity’ with role shift and shift in backgrounding/foregrounding.
IV. Derived from (b2): Perspectivity cannot be suspended at all. Cognition and 
conceptualization are always forms of perspectivity, roles intrinsically have 
perspective, a hidden identical “state of affairs” is not to be assumed: Perspec-
tivity is ‘fundamental perspectivity’.
As you see, I did not mention two positions any longer: (al) excludes any concept 
of perspectivity and (bl) does not supply us with any practical concept for dealing 
with perspectivity. So in the following I concentrate on the positions involving 
two practical preparatory concepts of grammatical perspectivity, i.e. the concept of 
semantic role and the concept of foregrounding or centrality.
6. Concepts for semantic roles
Now, how are roles to be understood? I will not discuss the whole ränge of problems 
connected with semantic or ‘thematic’ roles (cf. for example Dowty 1989). The in- 
tuitions behind the concept are: (1) There are systematic, non-arbitrary correla- 
tions between the participants of States of affairs (i.e. events, processes and States) 
and the syntactic complements expressing those participants. (2) These correla- 
tions can be (partly) explained by generalizing the two-place relations between the 
state of affairs and the individual participant. (Note, that so far it does not matter 
which one of the two starting points, proposition or state of affairs, is chosen.) So 
we might accept the definition in Kamp and Roßdeutscher (1994:101): “Thematic 
roles are functions from eventualities (i.e. events, processes or States) to entities that 
are implicated (in one way or another) in those eventualities”. Again the different 
concepts of semantic roles can be associated with the alternatives (ai) versus (bi) 
from Section 5:
Concept 1 based on (al): denotative concept of semantic role 
Concept 2 based on (a3): designative concept of semantic role, assuming in addi- 
tion a possible denotative identity
Concept 3 based on (b2): designative concept of semantic role without assuming 
denotative identity.
Fillmore (1968) supported a concept of denotative semantic roles (Concept 1): A 
state of affairs is capturcd in one and only one canonical form involving a certain 
constant configuration of semantic roles likc AGENT, PATIENT, EXPERIENCER. 
These remain invariable throughout all the different syntactic representations of a
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“scene” for instance by converse verbs like the ones mentioned above. Perspectivity 
can only play a role insofar as certain participants may be selected from the whole 
set of participants and insofar as perhaps one or the other is being foregrounded.
In contrast Helbig pleads in several articles (cf. especially Helbig 1992) for a 
designative concept of semantic role (Concept 2). Designative roles may reflect 
different aspects of participation for identical participants in a single scene: The 
participant who sells a book is identical to the one from whom the book is bought; 
but as a seller he plays a role different from the role he plays as the man who is 
bought from. A designative concept presupposes a non-arbitrary relation between 
surface cases and semantic roles. Whcreas Fillmore seems to assume such an arbi- 
trary relationship, in this conception a rule-guided relation between surface cases 
and semantic roles is argued for. In this connection one idea was extremely influ- 
ential: the idea of a hierarchy of semantic roles that is connected with -  not in a 
one-to-one mapping, but in a rule-guided manner -  a hierarchy of syntactic cases. 
There are different proposals for such an hierarchy (Dik 1981; Givon 1984; Primus 
1995), see also in the Government and Binding framework the concept o f ‘linking’ 
(e.g. Wunderlich 1997).
7. Hierarchy of semantic roles and syntactic mapping in GDS
7.1 Hierarchy of roles
I will give here a simplified Version of the hierarchy presented in the “Grammatik 
der Deutschen Sprache” (GDS, Zifonun et al.: 1326), which has been influenced 
especially by Plank (1979). In general the concept of ‘designative semantic role’ 
is adopted
AG > poss > OBICAUS [THEME]
ORN
> CO-AG > THEME > LOC
INSTR
AG: ‘agent’, CAUS: ‘causer’, REC: ‘recipient’, POSS: ‘possessor’, EXP: ‘experiencer’, 
OBJ: ‘involved entity, entity undergoing changes (in place, substance or consis- 
tency)’, THEME: abstract entity dealt with’ (sub-role of generalized OBJ), CO-AG: 
‘co-agent, person acting in an event together with an agent’, ORN: ‘ornative, ob- 
ject/substance as a means for changing OBJ’, LOC: ‘locative’, INSTR: ‘Instrument’. 
LOC can be divided into the sub-roles GOAL, SOURCE and PATH.
Role hierarchy in GDS reflects salience Order: The leftmost role, the role pre- 
ceding all other roles in hierarchy, is the most salient role, along the dimensions 
‘activity’ und ‘animateness’. For the current introductory purpose it is assumed, 
that AG shares its primary hierarchical position with CAUS, which is equal to AG
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with respect to ‘activity’. The three roles of the set ‘animate’ next to AG in hierarchy 
(constituting an equivalence dass) are salient along the dimension of ‘animateness’, 
whereas OBJ/THEME are only salient with respect to ‘involvement’.
There is now the hypothesis that only the roles before the vertical line can be 
expressed in German by a case form, whereas the ones after the line can’t. Note, 
that THEME can show up before and after the line. We assume for instance, that 
Sie sprachen über seine Probleme (“They talked about his problems”) as well as Sie 
besprachen seine Probleme (“'They PREF-talked his problems”) involve a THEME. 
The difference between the two realizations is not fully understood yet and by now 
not attributed to a role difference. The general division between two sets of roles 
(with the just mentioned exception) implies that e.g. sentences like Er lädt Heu 
auf den Wagen (“He loads hay on the truck”) and Er belädt den Wagen mit Heu 
(“He loads the truck with hay”) receive different role configurations, since e. g. der 
Wagen as accusative object may not receive a locative role. The correlation for the 
subject and objects according to the GDS are:
AG
CAUS
REC
POSS
EXP
OBJ
[THEME]
ORN
> CO-AG > THEME > LOC
(Pr-Obj or Adv-Compl)
7.2 Patterns of conceptualization
We can now sketch the patterns of conceptualization for the pairs of converses pre- 
sented above. As you will notice, names have been given to the patterns reflecting in 
short the difference in perspectivity going back to different configurations of roles.
Pattern 1. ATTENTION -  STIMULATION
ATTENTION: Hans interessiert sich für das Buch
Hans-NOM interest-3sG.PRES he-REFL.Aec for the-ACC book-ACC 
“Hans is interested in the book”
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STIMULATION: Das Buch interessiert Hans
The-NOM book-NOM interest-3sG.PRES Hans-Acc 
“'The book interests Hans”
interessieren
ATTENTION
STIMULATION
interessieren
Hans sich für das Buch
Subj
\
[Acc-Obj] Pr-Obj
\
\
ARGl(EXP)
/
\
ARG2(TH)
/
/
Acc-Obj
/
Subj
Hans das Buch
This double patterning is characteristic for a lot of German verbs denoting men-
tal and emotional attitudes like jemand freut sich über etwas -  etwas freut jeman-
den (“be glad about” -  “make glad”), jemand ärgert sich über etwas -  etwas ärg-
ert jemanden (“to be annoyed by” -  “annoy”), ich begeistere mich für etwas -  et-
was begeistert mich (“to be enchanted” -  “enchant”) and so on. As you will have 
noticed, in English there exist also two different patternings, but the grammati- 
cal constructions dififer from the German ones: Whereas in German you have two 
active, process-denoting constructions, in English an active, process-denoting im-
personal construction (not possible with all verbs) is contrasted with a resultative 
state-denoting personal construction. In German this last option can be realized 
in addition (ich bin erfreut über, ich bin verärgert über, ich bin begeistert von). Tak- 
ing the cross-linguistic perspective of European languages, it can be shown that this 
double or even threefold Variation in conceptualizing mental attitude is widespread 
and seems to mirror two principally different strategies: By choosing the first pat-
tem (ATTENTION) mental attitudes are seen as controlled activities of the experi- 
encer directed to their emotional contents (‘themes’). By the second pattem mental 
attitudes are conceived as stimulated, provoked from within a more passive expe- 
riencer by the emotional Stimulus. This difference is not reflected by a correspond- 
ing role difference in this approach. One alternative would have been to interpret 
STIMULATION as a subtype of CAUSATION and to ascribe the role CAUS to the 
impersonal subject phrase (das Buch). STIMULATION would be conceived as an 
internal causal process doing its work in the mind of the experiencer. We did not 
choose this solution for the following reason: Although constructions with lexical 
causatives in German normally allow for passivation transforming the object of the 
active sentence to the subject of the passive sentence, this is not, or only marginally 
acceptable in this case:
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(3) *Ich werde von dem Buch /durch das
I-n o m  get-lsG.PRES by the-DAT book-DAT /through the-ACC 
Buch begeistert /interessiert.
book-Acc enchant-PARTlI /interest-PARTlI
“I am enchanted/interested by the book/through the book”.
In this case, the difference in perspective remains beyond the threshold of differen- 
ciated role concepts.
Pattern 2. TRANSACTION-TRANSFER
TRANSACTION: Hans schickt Eva ein Buch
Hans-NOM send-3sG.PRES Eva-DAT a-Acc book-Acc
“Hans sends Eva a book”
TRANSFER: Hans schickt ein Buch an Eva
Hans-NOM send-3sG.PRES a-Acc book-Acc to Eva-Acc 
“Hans sends a book to Eva”
schicken Hans Eva ein Buch
TRANSACTION
Subj
\
Dat-Obj Acc-Obj
\
\
ARGl(AG)
/
ARG2(REC/LOK)
\
ARG3(OBI)
/
Subj Acc-Obj Pr-Obj
TRANSFER
schicken Hans ein Buch an Eva
In this case the double patterning indeed involves role shift for the second argu- 
ment (ARG2). In the pattem of TRANSACTION the second argument figures as 
recipient, whereas it figures as locative goal in the pattem of TRANSFER. The pat-
tem of TRANSACTION is restricted to personal arguments (natural persons or in- 
stitutions), the locative goal of the pattern of Transfer is unrestricted: Hans schickt 
ein Buch nach Frankfurt -  *Hans schickt Frankfurt ein Buch (“Hans sends a book to 
Frankfurt” -  *Hans sends Frankfurt a book”). The dative object representing ARG2 
in recipient role can be promoted to subject in passive voice (so called bekommen- 
Passiv): Eva bekommt ein Buch geschickt (“Eva is sent a book”), prepositional ob- 
jects are excluded from promotion. In English we observe the corresponding phe- 
nomenon o f ‘dative alternation/shiff’. For the German and the corresponding En-
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glish converses there exists a slight semantic difference between the elements of the 
pair, which can be made explicit in the following elaborations:
(4) a. Hans schickte das Buch an Eva, aber sie hat es nicht erhalten.
“Hans sent the book to Mary, but she didn’t get it” 
b. '‘Hans schickte Eva das Buch, aber sie hat es nicht erhalten.
“Hans sent Mary the book, but she didn’t get it”
(cf. Czepluch 1997:6)
This difference Supports the role shift between REC and LOC and could in addition 
be taken as one piece of argument in favour of the narrower concept o f‘designative 
roles’, where no denotative identity is to be assumed (Concept 3 ffom Chapter 6). In 
this case, however, there is an implicational relationship between the two patterns. 
Or more exactly:
(Implication 1): Whenever in a Situation s; a proposition of the pattem of 
TRANSACTION holds, then also the corresponding pattem of TRANSFER 
holds (provided that the predicate expression of the proposition provides for 
this conversion), but not vice versa.4
Pattern 3. TRANSFER-AFFECTEDNESS
TRANSFER: Hans füllt Wein in die Flasche
Hans-NOM fill-3sG.PRES wine-ACC into the-ACC bottle-Acc 
“Hans fills wine into the bottle”
AFFECTEDNESS: Hans füllt die Flasche mit
Hans-NOM fill-3sG.PRES the-Acc bottle-Acc with 
Wein 
wine-DAT
“Hans fills the bottle with wine”
füllen Hans Wein in die Flasche
TRANSFER
Subj
\
Acc-Obj Adv-Compl
\
ARG 1 (AG)
/
ARG2(OBJ/ORN) ARG3(LOC/OBJ)
/
Subj Acc-Obj Pr-Obj
AFFECTEDNESS
füllen Hans die Flasche mit Wein
lO l
In this case, there is a double role shift. The locative argument (ARG3) of the 
pattem of TRANSFER adopts the OBJ-role in the pattem of AFFECTEDNESS, 
whereas the OBJ-argument (ARG2) of TRANSFER becomes ORN in the pattem 
of AFFECTEDNESS. The exchange in the role of strongly involved participant 
(=OBJ) and the loss of a locative role seems to be quite a dramatic change offen 
characterized as an additional ‘holistic’ component concerning the OBJ argument 
of the pattern of AFFECTEDNESS. Again we may capture this component by an 
elaboration:
(5) a. Hans füllte Wein in die Flasche, aber sie wurde nicht ganz voll.
“Hans filled wine into the bottle, but it didn’t get quite full” 
b. *Hans füllte die Flasche mit Wein, aber sie wurde nicht ganz voll.
“*Hans filled the bottle with wine, but it didn’t get quite full”
Again there is an implicational relationship between the two patterns, quite ana- 
logue to the first one:
(Implication 2): Whenever in a Situation s; a proposition of the pattern of 
AFFECTEDNESS holds, then also the corresponding pattern of TRANSFER 
holds (provided that the predicate expression of the proposition provides for 
this conversion), but not vice versa.
Generalizing over the two patterns considered by now we may conclude that the 
locative pattern of TRANSFER makes a somewhat “weaker” claim than the the 
associated patterns of TRANSACTION or AFFECTEDNESS. Note, that in this 
framework the relationship between the patterns is not interpreted as some sort 
of ‘meaning inclusion’, but as two independent meanings interrelated only by im- 
plications (meaning postulates).
We get a similar picture with some pairs of converses in word formation: laden 
(“load”), hängen (“hang”), kleben (“glue”), malen (“paint”), bauen um (“build 
around”), hüllen um (“lay around”), ziehen über (“pull over”), legen unter (“lay 
under”) (TRANSFER), beladen, behängen, bekleben, bemalen, umbauen, umhüllen, 
überziehen, unterlegen (AFFECTEDNESS). In the case of jemandem etwas liefern -  
etwas liefern an jemanden -  jemanden mit etwas beliefern (“deliver”) we even have 
three patterns: TRANSACTION; TRANSFER; AFFECTEDNESS.
Verb pairs like kaufen -  verkaufen (“buy” -  “seil”) or erben -  vererben (“in- 
herite” -  “leave as a heritage”) seem to be more isolated within German word for-
mation, but there are also instances of this pattern of RECEPTION-TRANSAC- 
TION with lexical conversion as geben -  bekommen/erhalten (“give” -  “receive”) or 
English buy -  seil.
102
Pattern 4. RECEPTION-TRANSACTION
RECEPTION: Hans kauft Bücher von Eva3
Hans-NOM buy-3sG.PRES books-Acc.PL ffom Eva-DAT 
“Hans buys books from Eva”
TRANSACTION: Eva verkauft Hans Bücher
Eva-NOM sell-3sG.PRES Hans-DAT 
“Eva sells Hans books”
books-Acc.PL
kaufen Hans Bücher von Eva
RECEPTION
Subj
\
Acc-Obj
\
Pr-Obj
ARGKAG/REC) ARG2(OBI) ARG3(SOURCE/AG)
Subj Dat-Obj Acc-Obj
TRANSACTION
verkaufen Eva Hans Bücher
As in the cases mentioned above also a pattem of TRANSFER can be realized with 
the transaction verb: verkaufen an, vererben an (“seil to”, “leave”).
In the case of active and passive, at the first sight there are no obvious role 
differences between the converses. But notice that in the GDS framework the von- 
phrase ist not to be regarded as a syntactic complement of the verb. If it were a syn- 
tactic complement, the AGENT-phrase necessarily would be represented as subject. 
You rememember AGENT is the semantic role with the highest rank correspond- 
ing to the syntactic case with the highest rank, the nominative of the subject. So I 
assume here that the pattem of ACTION (active voice) is associated with a pattern 
of corresponding PROCESS, where a “degraded agent” is supposed to be involved 
but need not be mentioned. This degradation is indicated by the broken line in 
the pattern representation; it means that the passive prepositional phrase is (most 
likely) to be regarded as an adjunct, not as a complement. Again as with pattern I 
one might assume a role difference, but again I shall leave the case open.
Pattern 5. ACTION-PROCESS (DEGRADING OF AGENT)
ACTION: Eva schenkt Hans das Auto
Eva-NOM give-3sc.PRES Hans-DAT the-ACC car-Acc 
“Eva gives Hans a car as a present”
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PROCESS: Das Auto wird Hans von Eva
the-NOM car-NOM be-3sG.PRES Hans-NOM by Eva-DAT
geschenkt
give-PARTÜ
“The car is given to Hans by Eva”
schenken
ACTIVE
Eva Hans das Auto
Subj Dat-Obj Acc-Obj
PASSIVE 
geschenkt werden
ARG l(AG) ARG2IREZ) ARG3(OBJ)
Subj Dat-Obj [Pr-Phrase]
das Auto Hans von Eva
In summary, my approach can be identified as Type IV, derived from (b2): Con- 
verse pairs are represented by pairs of patterns that assign (in most cases) different 
(designative) participant roles to some arguments out of the whole set of identi- 
cal arguments of the corresponding patterns. Denotative identity is not explicitely 
assumed and not reflected in the representation.
8. Two-level approaches: Denotative and designative level
You might say, that Approach II derived form (a3) seems more interesting and 
more adequate. And indeed, there are two approaches in the spirit of (IIa3), ap- 
parently independent of each other: the approaches of Jackendoff 1991 and Ickler 
1990.  ^Both assume a two-level approach. On the first level they represent a state of 
affairs only by roles involving concepts like Theme, Place, Path, Goal (Jackendoff) 
or statische Entität (“static entity”), dynamische Entität (“dynamic entity”), verur-
sachende Entität (“causing entity”) (Ickler). This level is called the “thematic tier” 
in Jackendoff 1991, and the level of “roles neutral in perspective” in Ickler. Only 
on a second level, the “action tier” or the level of “perspective roles” like Actor; Pa-
tient; Beneficiary (Jackendoff), “effected entity”; “affected entity”, “ornative entity” 
(Ickler) is introduced.
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8.i Jackendoff
With the help of this two level approach in Jackendoff 1991 typical converse pairs 
like ours obtain a common representation on the first level (reflecting their de-
notative identity) and differ in representation on the second level. So Jackendoff 
comments pairs like Bill loads books on the truck -  Bill loads the truck with books, 
Bill smears paint on the wall -  Bill smears the wall with paint with the following 
words: “The thematic relations in each case are the same: the books go onto the 
truck, the paint goes onto the wall. The change is in which entity is viewed as most 
directly “affected” by Bill’s action and the direct object has a stronger claim on the 
role in either case. Thus the action tier is strongly implicated in choice of objects 
as well as subjects” (Jackendoff 1991:130). The corresponding representations are 
(in a simplified version):
common representation on thematic tier for load on -  load with (see Pattern 3)
[CAUSE([BILL], [INCH [BE ([HAY]; [ON [TRUCK]])]])]
“Bill causes that hay Starts to be on the truck”
action tier for load on:
[AFF ([BILL], [HAY])] 
action tier for load with:
[AFF ([BILL], [TRUCK])]
The first denotative level (“thematic tier”) is ‘localistic’. Events are on this funda-
mental level events of motion or stativity or events of causing those events of mo- 
tion or stativity. This localistic view comprehends not only the field of spatial loca- 
tion and motion, but also possession (covering the concepts o f‘have’, ‘possess’, ‘seil’, 
buy’ and so on), ascription of properties (concepts like ‘be + adjective’) or schedul- 
ing of activities (concepts like ‘take place’, ‘change/keep’). There is, by the way, not 
only in the approach of Jackendoff, going back to Gruber 1965, a general tendency 
to reconstruct conceptual or semantic categorization in quite a mechanistic model.
Let us return to the question of semantic roles: In Jackendoff’s representa-
tions no role names show up. Theme, Agent and so on are not primitives of the 
semantic theory, but “particular structural configurations in conceptual structure” 
(Jackendoff 1991:47). So, in our example, Bill is Agent, because Agent is is the first 
argument of the Event-function CAUSE (ibid.),7 hay is Theme, because it is the 
first argument of the State-function BE, truck is Goal, because it is the argument 
of ON in a configuration, where ON is embedded within INCH and INCH em- 
bedded in CAUSE. This approach to semantic roles seems to be quite promising 
since it avoids role concepts as unmotivated labels -  provided that the language of
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conceptual representation itself has a clear cut design and can be interpreted along 
the established rules of (for instance) model theoretic Interpretation. I leave this 
question open for the language Jackendoff adopts.
What about the the second level, the “action tier”? Again role concepts are 
“hidden” in the structural framework: The first argument of the function AFF (“af- 
fect”) is the Actor, the second is the Patient. There is no one-to-one-mapping be- 
tween the roles of the two tiers. In our Pattern 3 the Agent of the thematic tier cor- 
responds to Actor on the action tier and either Theme or Goal of the thematic tier 
can be represented as Patient (yielding the different ‘designative’ interpretation). 
But there are also different correspondences.
Look for example at Jackendoff’s solution for my Pattern 2:
common representation on thematic tier for give (double object) -  giveto (see 
Pattern 2):
[CAUSE([BILL], [GOposs ([BOOK], FROM [HARRY] 
TO [SAM]
)])]
“Bill causes that a book goes-in-possession from Harry to Sam”
action tier forgiTe (double object):
[AFF+ ([BILL], [SAM])]
action tier forgive to:
[AFF ([BILL], [BOOK])]
Here the Theme only in give NP to NP is considered as “some sort of quasi-Patient” 
(Jackendoff 1991:136), whereas in the double object construction the personal 
object is interpreted as Beneficiary (first argument of AFF+) (ibid.: 135).
PH not present his solution for “psych-verbs” (see Pattern 1) in detail. Jack-
endoff tries here to extend his approach of “force-dynamics” also to converse pairs 
like please-like (lexical converses, roughly corresponding to Pattern 1), associating 
with them patterns of ‘positive Affection and ‘positive Reaction’ correspondingly 
(cf. ibid.: 141).
8.2 Ickler
Ickler does not decompose the verbs in primitive semantic predicates. In this re- 
spect the approach is nearer to the GDS approach; indeed the GDS description 
has partly been influenced by Ickler. Ickler also does not present a full description 
in terms of semantic roles. But we may contrast in the spirit of her analysis the 
German Version of Jackendoff’s load on-load with alternation (Pattern 3) (Ickler 
1990:15):
io6 Gisela Zifonun
DYN./CENTRAL STAT./PERIPHERAL 
Hans lädt Heu auf den Wagen
STAT./CENTRAL DYN./PERIPHERAL 
Hans belädt den Wagen mit Heu
As in Jackendoff’s approach, the underlying level, representing the state of affairs 
“neutral in perspective”, is localistic in a way. Heu (“hay”) denotes in both patterns 
the entity being moved, the “dynamic entity”, Wagen (“truck”) denotes in both 
patterns the “static entity”, the entity not being moved. Change in perspectivity de- 
pends on whether the dynamic or the static entity is in the focus of the speaker’s 
interest. The pattern where the dynamic entity is in the focus (f) is called “existence 
perspective” with respect to f, the pattern where the static entity is in the focus f is 
called “characterizing perspective” with respect to f. As you can see, Ickler connects 
the question of perspectivity not only with the concept of denotative and designa- 
tive role but also with the notion of centrality or periphericity, i.e. with the concept 
of foregrounding/backgrounding. That is, in the approach of Ickler ( not so appar- 
ent in the approach of Jackendolf) we have position (IIIa2) + (a3): As in the GDS 
Ickler Starts with a concept of syntactic-morphological centrality (only pertinent 
to subject and accusative object). But she joins to this syntactic concept the idea of 
a centrality with respect to the interest of speaker/hearer. Subject and direct object, 
she says, are being mentioned for their own sake, not in order to characterize other 
participants.
In my opinion this pragmatic concept of centrality is to be kept apart from 
a concept of semantic centrality -  hidden in the GDS and Jackendoff approach. 
Pragmatically central participants are central with respect to the Speaker (and are 
supposed to be equally central from the viewpoint of the hearer): those entities 
the Speaker is dealing with for their own sake. Semantically central entities are 
those central with respect to the eventuality: those entities that are most promi-
nent (active, involved) in the scene.s Now distinguishing those two concepts on 
theoretical grounds does not mean that we could decisively say which of them is 
‘really’ involved in our case. Perhaps further investigation will show that indeed 
both are needed.
9. Propositional perspectivity and discourse
The indeterminateness concerning semantic and pragmatic centrality however is 
not to be transferred to the level of utterance and connected discourse. The (se- 
mantic/pragmatic) centrality of participants in patterns of conceptualization is not 
to be confused with actual topic-comment-structure nor with actual focus strucure 
(see also the contribution by von Stutterheim and Klein in this volume). Those
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structures in actual discourse are expressed by means of word ordering and in- 
tonation. Thus conceptual centrality is connected with the level of utterance and 
discourse only in an indirect way. Paradoxically, the central entities of conceptu- 
alization usually tend to stay in the background of actual utterances: The subject 
most typically figures as topic, i.e. it represents the already known background, 
starting point for important, foregrounded information. It also tends to be placed 
in the first part of the utterance or even as the first constituent, whereas the infor- 
mational focus of the utterance tends to be in the second part of the utterance. At 
the same time, as we have seen, the subject belongs (together with the direct object) 
to the conceptual centre of the corresponding pattem. Thus when we are interested 
in perspectivity of discourse we have to take into account one general correlation: 
What is to be the informational centre or focus in an ungoing discourse, should 
not be central in the sense of grammaticalized perspectivity. Look at the following 
short part from a story by Bert Brecht:
(1) Herr Keuner dachte, die Reichen seien schlechte Leute, aber seine Freundin 
dachte, sie seien nicht schlecht. (2) Warum dachte sie, die Reichen seien nicht 
alle schlecht? (3) Sie dachte es nicht, weil sie Geschenke von ihnen annahm, 
denn sie glaubte von sich selber, sie würde keine Geschenke von schlechten 
Leuten annehmen.
(B. Brecht, Prosa Bd. 2 (Geschichten von Herrn Keuner): 402)
“(1) Herr Keuner thought, the rieh were bad people, but his friend thought 
they weren’t bad. (2) Why did she think, the rieh were not all bad? (3) She 
didn’t think so, because she accepted presents from them, and she believed of 
herseif that she wouldn’t accept presents form bad people.”
In sentence (3) sie refers to Keuner’s friend who had been introduced in sentence 
(1) and is to be considered a a topic both in sentence (2) and (3). So sie repre-
sents background information for the ongoing narration, which is focussed on the 
new information about the presents she receives. In the embedded sentence weil 
sie Geschenke annahm (part of (3)) sie is subject in the role of RECIPIENT and is 
semantically/pragmatically central in a pattem of RECEPTION. So this is a typical 
case of non-coincidence between conceptual foreground and discourse focus. This 
kind of a balancy between conceptual centrality and discourse or informational 
centrality is up to further investigation.
to. Conclusion
There are different approaches to grammaticalization of propositional perspectiv-
ity, reaching from a concept of fundamental perspectivity in conceiving eventual-
io8
ities (GDS approach with designative semantic roles), over concepts of secondary 
perspectivity (involving both a concept of denotative and designative semantic 
role, approach of Jackendoff) to approaches with secondary perspectivity and fore- 
grounding/backgrounding (approach of Ickler). The only common ground ofthese 
approaches is the insight that natural languages apparently make use of alternative 
patterns of conceptualization. Therefore there must be a surplus in doing so that 
can be ascribed to the Speakers perspective in the very broad sense of Section 2: 
The alternative patterns reflect different degrees of nearness and distance that the 
Speaker may attribute to the participants of the eventuality within a dimension of 
participation and/or Speakers interest.
Notes
1. Some of the converses are acceptable in English, e.g. “A is pleased with B” -  “B pleases A”.
2. Conversion is in some cases realized by simple verbs in English: “A loads B on C” -  “C is 
loaded with B by A”.
3. With particle verbs the converse relation often holds only for certain complements: A 
zieht ein Laken über das Bett -  A überzieht das Bett mit einem Laken, are converses. But: A 
zieht einen Pullover über den Kopf-A überzieht den Kopf mit einem Pullover are not converses.
4. Note that Czepluch ibid.,. explains the difference not by role shift but by two different 
verb meanings.
5. There is a facultative additional prepositional phrase denoting the amount of money be- 
ing exchanged (e. g. für 50 DM, “for fifty marks”) whose Status as a verb complement may 
be debated and which is neglected here.
6. There are lots of approaches dealing with verb patterns in English and German, especially 
from the context of Case Grammar or Generative Grammar. But I restrict myself to these 
two approaches, since my interest here is quite a general one so that the manyfold differences 
in detail, coming up in these approaches, are not that important.
7. There is, for me, an ambiguity concerning roles: Are roles roles of world entities (like Bill) 
or roles of linguistic entities (like Bill). Jackendoff seems to choose the first alternative. But 
surely Bill (or more precisely: BILL) is the first argument of CAUSE.
8. Cf. also Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (1982/1987) where subject, and in second O r-
der direct object represent a kind of cognitive foreground in conceptualizing a scene: they 
are the most active ore most intensively involved participants -  independent from their 
individual roles.
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